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GOVERNMENT-OWNED banks have kept their presence in the financialsectors of both developed and developing countries.1 Their existence has
been justified by their support of projects that are not financed by private
banks. Levine (2006) argues that government-owned banks may promote
growth by financing firms that are not able to access credit markets. These
firms may be small, may not have enough collateral or may lack credit
histories. Government-owned banks may also stimulate growth by promoting
financial development and mitigating market failures in some countries (Gers-
chenkeron, 1962; Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004). Moreover, these banks promise to
fund socially valuable projects that reduce poverty. Their positive impact on
growth is known in the literature as the development view.
In contrast, cross-country studies have shown that there is a negative rela-
tionship between government ownership of banks and economic growth. For
example, using data from 92 countries around the world, La Porta et al. (2002)
show that countries with high government ownership of banks in the 1970s had
lower economic growth, lower productivity growth and a financial system that
developed more slowly. These findings support the ‘political view’ of govern-
ment involvement in the banking sector. According to this view, government-
owned banks exist not to channel funds to socially efficient and desirable
projects but to satisfy the objectives of politicians, such as providing benefits to
their supporters. Politicians get their return in the form of votes, political con-
tributions or even bribes (Kornai, 1979; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).1 For example, in the mid-1990s, the government controlled about one-fourth of the assets of the
largest banks in industrialised countries, and about half of the assets of the banks in developing
countries (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2004). Even though there were massive privatisation efforts, govern-
ment banks still operate in some developed countries, such as Germany, France and Japan, and they
have been preserving their involvement especially in countries with less-developed financial sys-
tems and less well-functioning institutional structure (Barth et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2002).
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road,
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involvement of government-owned banks in the banking sector at the aggre-
gate level. The hypothetical transmission mechanism for these banks is either
provision of greater overall bank credit flows or improved financing of small
and medium enterprises. However, this approach ignores that government-
owned banks are also expected to help areas that are underdeveloped. As a
result, aggregate-level analysis may underestimate the actual impact of gov-
ernment-owned banks in the domestic market. A recent study by Onder and
Ozyildirim (2010) examines the impact of bank credits by government-owned
and private banks on local growth in Turkey and present evidence that gov-
ernment-owned banks supported local growth only in the well-developed
provinces.
In this study, we also analyse the lending behaviour of banks at the pro-
vincial level and contribute to the literature by testing whether government-
owned banks are more inclined to favour provinces with stronger political
clout. In other words, we try to understand whether the existence of govern-
ment-owned banks in Turkey can be explained by the development or politi-
cal view. Moreover, the economic significance of resources channelled by
both government-owned and private banks is estimated to assess the impor-
tance of bank credits by ownership type on the economic growth rate of
Turkish provinces.
The association between bank credits and growth of Turkish provinces2 that
have the political support of the governing party is examined using the panel
data over the period 1992–2006. Turkey is an interesting country to examine
this relationship. First, the banking sector constitutes a significant part of the
financial sector in Turkey. As of 2006, about 88 per cent of total financial sec-
tor assets are composed of bank assets (CBRT, 2006). Second, despite the
extensive privatisation efforts, government-owned banks have retained their
prominent role in the banking sector. Three government-owned banks operate
in Turkey and they control almost one-third of the assets of the banking sector
in 2009. Third, even though the government has been designated some prov-
inces as priority provinces for investment and has provided incentives to accel-
erate the development process in these provinces since the late 1960s, 50 out
of 81 provinces have been classified as priority provinces. Fourth, there are
several instances that government-owned banks have provided loans for politi-
cal reasons. For example, in 2007, two government-owned banks gave a $750
million loan to the new owner of Turkey’s second largest media conglomerate,
who is close to the prime minister. The credits from the government-owned
banks were given three days before the payment deadline at a below-market2 In Turkey, provinces are functional regions and include territorial units such as municipalities
and villages.
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down.3 Hence, the findings of this study on the role of government-owned
banks on regional growth and the impact of politics in this relationship will
have several policy implications not only for Turkey, but also for other devel-
oping countries where government-owned banks operate pervasively.
Our findings seem to be consistent with the political view. We find that in
general, credits by government-owned banks have no significant association
with the provincial growth. Nonetheless, their credits are positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in
the less-developed and politically connected provinces, and also the developed
and politically non-advocate provinces. Unlike government-owned bank credits,
private bank credits are found to be positively and significantly correlated with
the per capita income growth, regardless of the development level of the
province or the advocacy of the local administration to the central government.
Our results also suggest that public investments can be an alternative to spur
income growth, especially in the less-developed provinces.
The organisation of the article is as follows: in Section 2, we present recent
literature on the impact of government-owned banks on economic growth. The
Turkish banking industry is explained in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the empirical model and the data. The empirical results and robustness checks
are summarised in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. The article is concluded in
Section 7.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the 1990s, government ownership of banks was pervasive across the globe
(La Porta et al., 2002). In developing countries, compelling amounts of the
largest banks’ assets were controlled by the government (Levy-Yeyati et al.,
2004). Government banks hold significant shares in the banking industry in
Europe as well. Munchau (2006) notes that in France, about two-thirds of the
banking system is owned by government; in Germany, that proportion increases
to about 75 per cent; in Spain, the public sector is still a dominant player
among savings banks (cajas).
Theoretical objections to government ownership of banks or market failure
in banking have been defended by the existence of large positive externali-
ties in favour of government bank ownership: poverty alleviation, financial
development and special focus on companies and individuals who might not be3 Birch (2008) reported that, ‘The loan provided by government-owned banks was far from cheap;
the 10-year financing with three years of non-payment was priced at the LIBOR plus 485 basis
points’.
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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between government-owned banks and growth generally supports the political
view explanation: their prevalence is negatively correlated with economic
growth and hinders financial development. For example, La Porta et al. (2002)
using a panel of 92 countries report that government ownership4 is larger in
countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial sys-
tems and lower productivity growth. Moreover, government ownership of banks
is found to reduce economic growth and financial development, controlling for
initial per capita income and initial financial development.5 Berger et al. (2004)
also find that as the market share of the government-owned banks increases,
the GDP growth rate in developing countries declines significantly.6
In the cross-country analysis, poor performance of the government-owned
banks is explained by the possible control of politicians on the management of
these banks to pursue their private interests. There are few studies in the litera-
ture that examine the political motivations behind the lending behaviour of
government-owned banks. Sapienza (2004) examines banks in Italy and finds
that government-owned banks charge lower interest rates than privately owned
banks. On average, the difference is about 44 basis points. She reports that
government-owned banks favoured large firms in general and firms located in
the distressed areas of southern Italy, where political patronage is more wide-
spread. Moreover, she presents evidence that party affiliation of the chairperson
of the government-owned bank has a positive impact on the interest rate dis-
count given by the bank in the provinces where the associated party is stronger.
Similar findings are reported in Japan. The results of a study by Imai (2009)
show that the members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party used govern-
ment-owned bank loans for political purposes.
To our knowledge, there are three studies that examine the lending behav-
iour of government-owned banks in developing economies. Khwaja and Mian
(2005) present evidence that government-owned banks in Pakistan provide
loans to high-risk borrowers with political connections. They estimate that the
cost of this lending behaviour is 0.3 to 1.9 per cent of the GDP every year.
Cole (2009) reports that although government-owned banks provide 5 to 10 per
cent more agricultural credits during election years in India, they were less
likely to be repaid than in non-election years. Moreover, these extra credits4 They measure government ownership of banks by using the share of government in the assets of
the top 10 banks.
5 The major econometric problem in these cross-country studies is the endogeneity issue. La Porta
et al. (2002) address this problem mainly by using the instrumental variables such as legal origins
(Common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law, and Socialist legal
origin) or religious compositions of the populations (Protestants, Catholic, Muslim and others) in
different countries.
6 The endogeneity problem in this study has been mitigated by using one-year lagged values of the
exogenous variables.
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Onder and Ozyildirim (2010) analyse the impact of bank credit on provincial
growth rates of per capita GDP in Turkey and find a paradoxical effect of gov-
ernment-owned bank credit on local growth: even though a positive association
is observed in developed provinces, this relationship is negative or insignificant
in less-developed provinces.
Overall, there is limited evidence in the literature that examines the relation-
ship between economic growth and the lending activities of banks at the local
level. Moreover, none of the previous studies examines the role of credits by
government-owned banks on the growth rate of provinces that have political
clout. In this study, we try to fill this gap in the literature by examining the
relationship between bank credits and local growth especially in politically
connected areas.3. BANKING IN TURKEY
The banking sector constitutes a large part of the Turkish financial system.
Although banks are involved in every aspect of financial activity in the country
and have been responsible for the expansion of the financial system, the size of
the banking sector is relatively small in Turkey compared to developed econo-
mies. In 2006, the ratio of bank assets to the nominal GDP was only 86.7 per cent.
The Turkish banking sector is comprised of deposit banks and investment
and development banks. There were 46 banks operating in Turkey at the end of
2006 (Panel A, Table 1). Three of the domestic deposit banks were government
owned and 14 of them were private. During the period between 1990 and 2006,
the system expanded rapidly but ultimately underwent substantial consolidation,
shrinking from 79 banks in 2000 to 46 in 2006. The number of government-
owned banks decreased mainly because of privatisation efforts. The decline in
the number of the private banks can be explained by the failure of 17 deposit
banks during the major banking and liquidity crisis in the 1999–2001 period.
Over the last two decades, the market structure of the banking sector in Tur-
key has changed significantly. During the 1990–2000 period with easy entry
restrictions, the average asset concentration of the largest five banks was 47 per
cent. The failure of deposit banks and the significant mergers and acquisitions
resulted in the increase in the concentration ratio of five largest banks to 63 per
cent in 2006, suggesting moderately concentrated market structure. Moreover,
while the largest bank in terms of asset size was a government-owned bank,
Ziraat Bank, until 2002, the leader in the sector was a private bank, Is Bank, in
2006 (Banking Regulatory and Supervision Authority, BRSA, 2009).
In Turkey, banks operate through their branches distributed throughout the
country, a system called branch banking. There are no local or regional banks. 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 1
Banks and Branches in Turkey
Panel A – Total Number of
Banks Branches
1990 2006 1990–2006 1990 2006 1990–2006
Deposit Banks
Government-Owned Banks 8 3 4.65 2,967 2,134 2,656
Private Banks 25 14 26.82 3,443 3,557 3,554
Foreign Banksa 23 15 16.65 113 1,066 219
Non-Deposit Banks
Investment and
Development Banks
10 13 13.47 17 44 22
All Banks 66 46 64.18 6,540 6,802 6,175
Panel B – Shares of Branches (per cent) in
Istanbul Three Big Provincesb
1990 2006 1990–2006 1990 2006 1990–2006
Deposit Banks
Government-Owned Banks 11.8 15.2 12.6 26.2 31.7 28.0
Private Banks 26.7 33.9 33.6 44.3 52.6 51.3
Foreign Banks 47.8 45.3 50.3 76.1 62.2 72.7
Non-Deposit Banks
Investment and
Development Banks
47.1 38.6 55.8 76.5 65.9 85.5
All Banks 20.3 29.8 25.8 36.6 47.5 42.6
Number of All Branches 1,333 2,031 1,700 2,403 3,240 2,801
Notes:
a In 2006, seven foreign banks were established and operating in Turkey, whereas 16 foreign banks, estab-
lished abroad, were only allowed to operate through opening their branches in Turkey. Foreign banks
increased their networks recently by purchasing several mid-sized private banks.
b The three provinces are Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.
Source: Turkish Banking Association.
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all government-owned banks are headquartered in Ankara (the country’s capital).
With the consolidation of the banking system (particularly among mid-size pri-
vate banks) and the downsizing of government-owned banks after the crisis in
2001, the number of bank branches declined from 7,837 in 2000 to 6,802 in 2006.
Neither the branches of government-owned banks nor those of private banks
are distributed uniformly in Turkey. The effect of uneven development within
Turkey manifested in the absolute dominance of bank branches in three prov-
inces, Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. These provinces collected 63 per cent of the
deposits and received 67 per cent of the credits granted in 2006. As seen from 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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provinces in 2006. Istanbul had the highest share, with 30 per cent of all bank
branches and 34 per cent of private bank branches in 2006. During the 1990–
2006 period, on average, one-fourth of all bank branches were located in Istan-
bul. Moreover, this province holds more than 10 per cent of government-owned
bank branches.
The investment and development banks have a small share in the banking
sector (e.g. 3.16 per cent in 2006) and engage in services such as trading in
goods, real estate or stock markets or to performing financial leasing activities.
Foreign banks also hold a small portion of the system in Turkey compared to
other developing economies. However, structural reforms and Turkey’s EU
accession prospect have attracted European and other foreign banks to invest in
the Turkish banking system since 2005, and their share has increased signifi-
cantly in recent years, i.e. from 5 per cent in 2004 to 12 per cent in 2006.
Table 2 shows some characteristics of the government-owned, private and
foreign deposit banks operating in Turkey in 1990 and 2006. It is observed that
the profitability of private banks is lower than the profitability of government-
owned banks in 2006. The high return on assets ratio of government-owned
banks indicates that these banks may be acting as profit seekers. Vakıfbank,TABLE 2
Deposit Bank Characteristics According to Ownership Type
Government-
Owned Banks
Private Banks Foreign Banks
1990 2006 1990 2006 1990 2006
Return on Total Assets (per cent) 1.81 2.60 2.85 1.75 3.27 2.46
Capital-to-Total Assets (per cent) 9.88 10.36 8.83 10.39 8.92 11.99
Non-Performing Loans-to-Total
Loans (per cent)
1.70 0.16 0.52 0.44 0.65 0.28
Liquid Assets-to-Total Assets
(per cent)
29.02 44.35 39.52 37.74 42.62 38.42
Loans-to-Total Assets (per cent) 45.79 32.83 42.85 48.08 47.59 56.29
Share in Total Assets (per cent) 45.21 29.57 42.32 54.78 3.42 12.24
Share in Total Loans (per cent) 45.13 21.58 39.53 58.56 3.54 15.30
Share in Total Deposits (per cent) 48.51 35.70 49.10 52.32 2.38 11.96
Assets per Branch (000TL) 26,585 66,711 21,443 74,153 29,942 55,339
Deposits per Branch (000TL) 15,584 51,970 13,594 45,695 11,420 34,907
Branches per Bank 370.88 716.33 137.72 255.86 8.86 71.47
Number of Personnel 80,825 39,223 68,145 73,220 3,012 25,794
Personnel per Branch 27.24 18.00 19.79 20.44 15.14 24.06
Note:
TL denotes Turkish lira. All monetary values are expressed in terms of their value in 2006.
Source: Turkish Banking Association.
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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bank since it has been publicly traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange since
1987, although the government holds almost 75 per cent of its shares. Since
the 2001 crisis, the other two government-owned banks have become much
more efficient in expectation of privatisation. On the other hand, core earnings
of both private and foreign banks have been slightly dampened because of the
increased competition among these banks.
With Turkey’s risky operating environment, the capitalisation ratio can be
considered to be only adequate for the three different ownership types of banks
in Turkey. They have held fewer non-performing loans in the 2000s, compared
to the 1990s. The liquidity of the Turkish banking sector is still high, around
40 per cent, considering the removal of the short-term financing needs of gov-
ernment in 2001 (see Ozkan, 2005, for the 2000–01 crisis). As seen in Table 2,
government-owned banks have more liquid assets than private and foreign
banks. Overall, after the establishment of the autonomous BRSA in 2000, the
financial performance of banks has improved remarkably (BRSA, 2009).
Since the early 1990s, private deposit banks have dominated the banking
sector in Turkey. They held more than half of the assets of the banking sector
(54.8 per cent) in 2006. Their share in the credit and deposit markets reached
more than 50 per cent in 2006. In comparison, government-owned banks hold
35.7 per cent of bank deposits, and their involvement in the loan market has
declined considerably since the 1990s. Foreign banks have increased their par-
ticipation in the Turkish banking system since 2005 by purchasing some
domestic banks and increasing the number of branches. Consequent to the hori-
zontal mergers and maintenance of networks, their share in the deposit and the
loan markets increased to 12 per cent and 15.3 per cent, respectively.
Unlike government-owned banks, both private and foreign banks have
increased their capacity over time by increasing their personnel and number of
branches. The significant loss of capacity in government-owned banks can be
explained by restructuring ⁄downsizing efforts by the government after the
financial crisis in 2001. Because of the consolidation of some government-
owned banks, the number of branches per bank has increased. Nevertheless,
holding almost one-third of the total assets, government-owned banks have
retained their significant presence in the banking sector.4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA
a. Empirical Model
To examine the relationship between bank credits and local growth in the
politically connected provinces, first the measure for political connection has to 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1050 Z. ONDER AND S. OZYILDIRIMbe defined. In Turkey, municipalities are the local administrative units and are
highly dependent on the central government for their income. They obtain their
revenues from local resources such as municipal taxes, user charges and other
revenues. About 75 per cent of local government revenues are obtained through
transfers from the central government. In addition to these transfers, municipal-
ities can receive loans from the central government or from private credit mar-
kets with a treasury reimbursement guarantee. It can be argued that if the local
administrator of the province, its mayor,7 belongs to the ruling party, it may be
easier to get credits from government-owned banks. In this study, we define
political connection of a province with the political party affiliation of its
mayor. If the mayor of a province is from the ruling party, this province is
defined to be politically connected or an advocate province, whereas if the
mayor does not belong to the political party of the government, it is called a
non-advocate province.
The following fixed effects model is estimated to assess how the impact of
government-owned and private bank credits on economic growth at the provin-
cial level changes with the political advocacy of provinces in Turkey over the
period 1992–2006:
GROWTHit ¼ a0 þ
X80
i¼1
biPROVINCEi þ a1GOVERNMENTit þ a2PRIVATEit
þ c0ADVOCATEit þ c1ADVOCATEit  GOVERNMENTit
þ c2ADVOCATEit  PRIVATEit þ UCONTROLit þ uit;
where GROWTHit is the growth rate in real GDP per capita in province i in
year t. PROVINCEi is a vector of dummy variables representing 80 provinces
in Turkey. GOVERNMENTit and PRIVATEit represent per capita credits pro-
vided by government-owned and private banks to province i in year t, respec-
tively.8 The dummy variable, ADVOCATE, takes a value of 1 for the provinces
where the mayor is affiliated with the ruling party and 0 otherwise. Since the
local authorities in Turkey are not invested with fiscal powers, the political
affiliation of the mayor to the ruling party (c0) is hypothesised to be sig-
nificantly associated with the development level of provinces. CONTROL
represents the vector of control variables that might affect per capita GDP
growth rate of a province. These variables include initial GDP per capita7 The mayor is the chief executive and representative of the municipality. She ⁄ he is elected for a
term of five years.
8 In the finance-growth literature, credit ⁄GDP is used as a measure of financial development. How-
ever, in this study, our aim is to measure the impact of bank credit on growth rather than analysing
the impact of financial development on growth. Therefore, we use per capita credits granted by
government-owned banks or private banks at the province level.
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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(URBANISATION), human capital in the province (SCHOOLING), functional
distance of the province (DISTANCE) and current state of the domestic econ-
omy (CRISIS).
a1 and a2 are the coefficients on the government-owned and private bank
credits, respectively. They represent the association between bank credits and
local growth in the non-advocate provinces. c1 and c2 are the coefficients on
the interaction variables between bank credits and advocate provinces. These
coefficients indicate the changes in the association between government-owned
or private bank credit and the growth rate of per capita GDP in advocate prov-
inces. If the development view is correct, government-owned bank credits are
expected to have a positive and significant association with the local develop-
ment for non-advocate and advocate provinces. In other words, a1 and
(a1 þ c1) are expected to be positive. If the political view is correct, the coeffi-
cients on government-owned bank credits in all types of provinces are expected
to be negative or insignificant, suggesting that the credits are provided for other
reasons rather than financing growth-oriented projects. On the other hand, pri-
vate bank credits are expected to have a positive relation with provincial
growth in both non-advocate and advocate provinces, i.e. a2 and (a2 þ c2) are
hypothesised to be positive.
Public investments are measured by the real public investments per capita in
a province. It is hypothesised that public investments have positive effect on
per capita provincial GDP growth rate. Similarly, urban population and human
capital are expected to be positively associated with the growth rate of provin-
cial per capita GDP. The urbanisation rate is measured as the proportion of
population that resides in the urban area of the province. Because primary and
secondary education is compulsory in Turkey, the number of high school stu-
dents per high school teacher is used as a measure of schooling or human capi-
tal. We use a dummy variable for crisis periods to incorporate the impact of
general downturns of the domestic economy on provincial markets. It is
expected that during crisis periods, the growth rate of provincial per capita
GDPs is lower. Turkey experienced a short-duration liquidity crisis in 1994 and
a long-duration financial crisis during 1999–2001. In 1994, the real GDP per
capita declined by 4.7 per cent. During the banking and liquidity crises, the
growth rate in real GDP per capita fluctuated. In 1999, it was )3.37 per cent,
then it increased by 6.77 per cent in 2000 and declined by 5.67 per cent in
2001. The 1999–2001 crisis resulted in the failure or consolidation of one
government-owned and 17 private banks. In the empirical model, the
CRISIS dummy variable takes a value of 1 in 1994, 1999, 2000 and 2001, and
0 otherwise.
In a regionally segmented banking system, banks are expected to turn
local funds into productive investment opportunities that will increase local 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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intermediation of local savings through local branches creates a pool of funds
at headquarters, and regional loan demands can be satisfied from this pool
without considering the regional deposit bases. In Turkey, all headquarters of
the private banks are located in Istanbul (Ist) and all headquarters of the
government-owned banks are located in Ankara (Ank). As the distance from
headquarters increases, it may be more difficult to find financing through the
banking system (Berger and Udell, 2002; Ozyildirim and Onder, 2007;
Jimenez et al., 2009). However, banks may be physically closer to potential
borrowers if they have branches in local markets. In the empirical model, it is
hypothesised that it is not a province’s physical distance from headquarters,
but its functional distance from headquarters that may have relation with local
growth. To compute functional distance (see Alessandrini et al., 2005), the
physical distance from headquarters is adjusted with the number of branches
in a province:
DISTANCEit ¼ ½BGitlnð1þ kmi;AnkÞ þ ½BPitlnð1þ kmi; IstÞ
BGit þ BPit ;
where BGit and BPit are the number of government-owned and private bank
branches located in province i in year t, respectively. kmi,Ank and kmi,Ist are the
distance in kilometres between the province i and Ankara, and between the
province i and Istanbul, respectively.
Since 1968, as part of Turkey’s planned development strategies, provinces
have been grouped as priority and non-priority provinces depending on their
development level. The list of priority provinces has been published annually
in the programme of the Council of Ministers on the implementation, coordina-
tion and monitoring of the public investment programme. At the beginning,
there were 23 provinces classified as priority development provinces. The num-
ber of priority provinces has been 50 since 1998. The government provides
direct and indirect support for the development of these provinces to reduce the
disparity among provinces.
To analyse whether government-owned and private bank credits affect the
growth rates in the priority and non-priority provinces differently and whether
this relationship changes with the political connection of these provinces, we
estimate our model for these two groups of provinces separately. If govern-
ment-owned banks provide credits to less-developed areas, then the coefficient
of the GOVERNMENT is expected to be greater that the coefficient of the
PRIVATE, especially in the less-developed provinces. Furthermore, it is
expected that the economic significance of the effect of bank credits regardless
of ownership type on the growth rate of provinces will not be significantly dif-
ferent in advocate and non-advocate provinces. However, if the political view 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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expected to be positive.b. The Data
A panel dataset is constructed by employing annual data on provincial char-
acteristics and credits provided by government-owned and private banks in the
provinces for the period between 1992 and 2006. There were 67 provinces in
Turkey at the beginning of the sample period. Fourteen new provinces were
established from districts of existing provinces during the sample period. In the
estimations, old provinces were excluded from the sample in the year when
new provinces were formed because of the artificial decline in the GDP level
of the old provinces in that year.
All data about banking activities are obtained from the Turkish Banking
Association. The other variables are taken from the Turkish Statistics Institute
and the Ministry of Finance. Table 3 shows the mean values of bank credits
and provincial characteristics for the whole sample, priority, non-priority,
advocate and non-advocate provinces. The definitions, the descriptive statistics
of all variables and their correlation coefficients are presented in Appendix
Table A1.
During the sample period, the average annual growth rate of real GDP in
Turkish provinces is 3.64 per cent. Since population growth rate is still positive
at a rate of 0.43 per cent, the annual growth rate in GDP per capita is slightly
lower: 3.23 per cent. Although the growth rate in GDP is higher in non-priority
provinces than priority provinces, because of the migration from priority to
non-priority provinces, real per capita GDP growth rate is lower in the non-
priority provinces. The annual population growth rate was )0.05 per cent in
the priority provinces, whereas it was 1.21 per cent in the non-priority prov-
inces. The notable difference between priority and non-priority provinces is
observed in terms of real GDP levels and lending activities.
The growth rate of GDP per capita is higher in advocate provinces than in
non-advocate provinces (4.05 per cent vs. 1.88 per cent). Although all types of
bank credits per capita are higher in the advocate provinces, the total number
of bank branches is higher in the non-advocate provinces.
Real per capita public investments vary significantly between priority and
non-priority provinces. The population growth of non-priority provinces, mostly
because of migration from priority regions, caused a growing amount of public
investments in the non-priority regions as well. According to the migration
statistics, around 70 per cent of the migrating population has been choosing
destinations in the non-priority regions.
On average, more than half the population lives in the urban areas of the
Turkish provinces. The average urbanisation rate is 54.8 per cent during the 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 3
The Mean Values of Some Characteristics of Turkish Provinces in the Sample Period 1992–2006
Provinces
All Priority Non-Priority Advocate Non-Advocate
Real Outputs
Growth in real GDP (per cent) 3.64 3.36 4.08 4.31 2.56
Growth in real GDP
per capita (per cent)
3.23 3.43 2.91 4.05 1.88
Real GDP (in million TL) 1,437 498 2,972 1,412 1,544
Real GDP per capita (TL) 1,434 1,060 2,044 1,484 1,362
Banking Variables (TL)
Bank Credits per capita 585.85 318.08 1,024.79 627.18 564.97
Government-owned Bank
Credits per capita
233.67 191.81 302.30 244.22 230.93
Private Bank Credits per capita 352.18 126.27 722.50 382.97 334.04
Other Variables
Public Investments per capita (TL) 81.17 73.79 93.31 80.50 85.03
Urban Population Rate (per cent) 54.77 50.90 61.07 55.09 54.47
Schooling (number of students) 17.06 17.54 16.31 16.86 17.37
Population (in thousands) 798 476 1,320 772 901
Growth in Population (per cent) 0.43 )0.05 1.21 0.17 0.76
Mayor is Politically Affiliateda
(per cent)
58.59 56.72 61.59 100 0
Distance 6.25 6.52 5.81 6.23 6.30
Number of Branches of All Banks 79.91 29.12 162.50 76.04 93.00
Number of Government-owned
Bank Branches
34.03 18.35 59.51 32.72 38.68
Number of Private Bank Branches 43.20 10.53 96.24 40.29 51.72
Notes:
All monetary values are expressed in terms of their value in 2006, when the average exchange rate was
US$1 ¼ 1.41TL.
a The elected mayor is politically affiliated with the incumbent government.
Sources: Turkish Banking Association, Turkish Statistical Institute and Ministry of Finance.
1054 Z. ONDER AND S. OZYILDIRIMsample period. The non-priority provinces have more urban population than
priority provinces and are becoming more populated because of continuing
migration. The number and quality of schools, hospitals, job opportunities, eco-
nomic and social conditions might explain this mobility. A negative population
growth rate in the priority regions ()0.05 per cent), with an average fertility
rate of 3.32 per cent, indicates a significant amount of migrating population
from priority provinces. On the other hand, the non-priority provinces had a
growth rate of 1.21 per cent, despite a 2.11 per cent fertility rate. In terms of
schooling, on average, high school teachers have more than one additional
student in their classes in the priority provinces compared to the non-priority
provinces. 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
POLITICAL CONNECTION, BANK CREDITS AND GROWTH 1055During the sample period, the majority of provinces are advocate provinces.
The percentage of advocate provinces among priority provinces is lower than
the advocate provinces among non-priority provinces. The non-priority prov-
inces are found to be closer to the banks’ headquarters than the priority prov-
inces. In addition to physical distance, the priority provinces are peripheral to
the headquarters because they have fewer branches. The average number of
branches in non-priority provinces is 162.5 but is only 29 in priority ones.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the fixed effects model are presented in Table 4. It is found
that credits provided by both government-owned and private banks are posi-
tively associated with per capita GDP growth rate in both advocate and non-
advocate provinces.9 However, the significant association of these credits to the
provincial growth rates changes according to the ownership types of banks.
The credits provided by the government-owned banks are found to be signifi-
cant in only advocate provinces, less-developed provinces that are politically
connected and developed provinces that are not politically connected. On the
other hand, private bank credits are found to be significantly associated with
the growth rate in all provinces regardless of their development level or their
advocacy to the ruling party.
These findings seem to support the political view rather than the develop-
ment view. In the less-developed regions, as emphasised by Micco and Panizza
(2006), local politicians may affect lending decisions of the government-owned
banks in their provinces, and they may closely monitor the funded projects to
ensure their re-elections. Since there is almost no incentive for loan officers of
government-owned banks to reduce the moral hazard problem at the provincial
level, local administrators may have played a role in lowering asymmetric
information between lenders and borrowers in the poor regions. However, in
our analysis, role of mayors on the government-owned bank lending did not
turn into welfare improving in the developed ⁄non-priority advocate provinces.
Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically connected borrowers do not have
real investments to make, and hence they have little incentive to borrow from
private banks where the loan has to be repaid. For our findings, we may argue
similarly such that local administrators in the developed advocate regions might9 We also estimated this model without interaction variable with ADVOCATE. It is found that the
association between provincial growth rate and the government-owned bank credit per capita is not
found to be significant in neither all provinces nor in provinces classified as priority or non-priority.
On the other hand, the coefficient on private bank credits is found to be significant in all provinces,
priority and non-priority provinces. The results are not reported to save space. They are upon
request from the authors.
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 4
Empirical Results of Fixed Effects with Interaction Variables between Advocate and
Non-Advocate Provinces
All
Provinces
Priority
Provinces
Non-Priority
Provinces
GOVERNMENT (a1) 0.0121 0.0095 0.0312*
(0.0115) (0.0100) (0.0182)
ADVOCATE * GOVERNMENT (c1) 0.0179* 0.0311*** )0.0193*
(0.0091) (0.0062) (0.0109)
PRIVATE (a2) 0.0200** 0.1035*** 0.0131**
(0.0078) (0.0377) (0.0056)
ADVOCATE * PRIVATE (c2) )0.0098* )0.0434 )0.0027
(0.0057) (0.0388) (0.0027)
PUBLIC INVESTMENT 0.1090*** 0.2036*** 0.0632
(0.0375) (0.0534) (0.0431)
URBANISATION 0.7463*** 0.5949*** 0.7744***
(0.0813) (0.0922) (0.1157)
SCHOOLING 0.0003 0.0009 )0.0015
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0012)
DISTANCE 0.0496 0.3116*** 0.0334
(0.0417) (0.1051) (0.0301)
CRISIS )0.0863*** )0.0748*** )0.0864***
(0.0038) (0.0054) (0.0057)
ADVOCATE 0.0097* 0.0115 0.0092
(0.0059) (0.0073) (0.0061)
GDP)1 )0.1965*** )0.2477*** )0.1910***
(0.0248) (0.0273) (0.0596)
Intercept 2.0563*** 0.9034 2.2082***
(0.3571) (0.6878) (0.7918)
Adjusted R2 0.4018 0.4098 0.4498
Number of Observations 1,120 680 440
Number of Provinces 80 49 30
Hypotheses
H1: a1 þ c1 ¼ 0 9.57*** 8.83*** 0.33
H2: a2 þ c2 ¼ 0 5.87** 23.87*** 5.04**
H3: a1 ¼ a2 0.28 5.40** 0.92
H4: a1 þ c1 ¼ a2 þ c2 3.70** 1.04 0.00
Notes:
The numbers in parentheses denote Newey–West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation corrected standard
errors. *, ** and *** show significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively. The
first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) test whether the coefficients on GOVERNMENT and PRIVATE in advocate
provinces are significantly different from zero, respectively. H3 and H4 test the equality of coefficients on
GOVERNMENT and PRIVATE in non-advocate and advocate provinces, respectively. The hypotheses are
tested using the Wald test. v2 ’s are reported in the table with their significance.
1056 Z. ONDER AND S. OZYILDIRIMhave to help politically connected firms to borrow from government-owned
banks for their economically undesirable projects providing evidence for politi-
cal view in Turkey.
When the economic significance of credits by government-owned and private
banks on local growth is considered, it is found that a 1 per cent increase in 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
POLITICAL CONNECTION, BANK CREDITS AND GROWTH 1057per capita government-owned bank credits is associated with a 0.030 per cent
increase in per capita GDP growth rate in advocate provinces, whereas a 1 per
cent increase in per capita private owned bank credits is associated with a
0.020 per cent increase in non-advocate provinces and 0.010 per cent increase
in advocate provinces.
The positive impact of private bank credits on local growth is noteworthy in
less-developed priority provinces. For example, a 1 per cent increase in per
capita private bank credits in non-advocate priority provinces is expected to
increase the growth rate in these provinces from 1.924 per cent to 2.123 per
cent.10 Similarly, the same increase in priority advocate provinces is expected
to increase the growth rate of these provinces from 4.360 per cent to 4.622
per cent, whereas a similar increase in per capita government-owned bank
credits is found to improve the growth rate to 4.537 per cent in advocate less-
developed provinces. Although government-owned bank credits seem to help
advocate less-developed provinces, their benefit is lower than that of the private
bank credits.
When non-priority provinces are examined, it is found that the association
between government-owned banks and provincial growth rate is significant in
non-advocate provinces. The negative coefficient on the interaction variable
between ADVOCATE and GOVERNMENT indicates that the association between
government-owned bank credits and growth rate is lower in advocate provinces
than in non-advocate provinces. A 1 per cent increase in government-owned
bank credits is expected to increase the growth rate of non-advocate, developed
provinces from 1.804 per cent to 1.860 per cent. On the other hand, the associa-
tion between private bank credits and growth is not significantly different in the
advocate and the non-advocate non-priority provinces. When we calculate the
economic significance of private bank credits, it is found that a 1 per cent
increase in private credits in non-priority provinces will change the growth rate
from 3.582 per cent to 3.619 per cent in advocate provinces, and from 1.804 per
cent to 1.828 per cent in non-advocate provinces.
The insignificant coefficient on the impact of government-owned bank cred-
its can be explained by the behaviour of these banks in priority provinces. The
government-owned banks may provide more credits in priority provinces that
are in shortage of funding. Hence, the causality may not be from credits to
local growth but from low local growth to government-owned bank credits,
resulting in an insignificant coefficient on government-owned bank credits in
all and priority provinces.1110 The mean per capita real GDP growth rate is 1.924 per cent in non-advocate priority provinces
and 4.360 per cent in advocate priority provinces. Similarly, the mean growth rate is equal to 1.804
per cent and 3.582 per cent in non-priority, non-advocate and advocate provinces, respectively.
11 We would like to thank the referee to bring this point to our attention.
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1058 Z. ONDER AND S. OZYILDIRIMThe impacts of the control variables on local growth are as expected. Public
investments and urbanisation are significantly and positively associated with
growth rates in all provinces. In terms of economic significance, the impact of
public investments on local growth is more than the impact of bank credits.
Significant losses of growth in the per capita GDPs in Turkish provinces are
observed in crisis years during 1992–2006.
Similar to the results from all provinces, urbanisation has a positive and
significant relationship with the growth rate of per capita GDP both in the pri-
ority and non-priority provinces. It is found that the contribution of public
investments is significant in the priority provinces, but not significant in
the non-priority provinces. One explanation is that public investments in the
developed non-priority provinces may be in health and education rather than
infrastructure, and therefore their effect may not be observed immediately
(see Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose, 2004, for similar findings in the
developed regions of Mexico).
The high school student enrolment per teacher has no significant association
with the growth of the per capita GDPs of the priority and non-priority prov-
inces. In the priority provinces, increased geographical distance of a province
from the banking-decision centres has a significant and positive relationship
with the growth rate of per capita real GDP. Since the distance is measured as
a functional distance and adjusted with the number of branches in a province,
in the interpretation of the impact of the functional distance on the local econ-
omy, we use the hypothesis that functionally distant banks specialise in lending
to more transparent borrowers, irrespective of the level of experience accumu-
lated by the bank in the local market (see Jimenez et al., 2009). Depending on
the physical distance of a province from the banks’ headquarters, increasing
the branching networks of banks, especially in the less-developed provinces,
may indicate growing profitable and transparent opportunities for banks in these
regions. This finding does not suggest causation from increasing bank concen-
tration to local growth, but rather a positive relation between increasing net-
works of banks and the growth in the provincial per capita GDPs, especially in
the less-developed provinces where both private and government-owned banks
have small numbers of branches (see Table 3). If the mayor of the province
belongs to the ruling party, that province has a higher growth rate than the
other provinces.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
It can be argued that the coefficient on the credit variable in ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions can be biased because of several reasons such as
measurement error, reverse causation and omitted variables. In the literature, 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
POLITICAL CONNECTION, BANK CREDITS AND GROWTH 1059the alternative methods to OLS are offered. One of them is to identify an
instrumental variable (IV) that will isolate part of the variation in the endo-
genous variable that is not associated with the biases. In the cross-country
growth literature, legal, geographical or ethnic diversity are used as possible
instruments. However, in our analysis, since cross-sections are regions of the
same country, finding appropriate IVs is not an easy task (Durlauf et al., 2005).
As a robustness check, we used the number of representatives in the Turkish
National Assembly from each province as an IV variable12 for the credits
provided by the government-owned banks (GOVERNMENT ) and estimate two-
stage least squares regression. The estimated coefficients on bank-related vari-
ables are reported in Panel A, Table 5. It is found that the government-owned
bank credit per capita is not significantly associated with the growth rate in the
non-advocate Turkish provinces whether they are designated as priority or not.
However, if all provinces or priority provinces have a mayor from the ruling
political party (advocate provinces), the coefficients are found to increase
significantly.
Considering the high correlation between credits provided by government-
owned and private bank (see Appendix Table A1), multicollinearity may also
cause biases in the estimated coefficients reported in Table 4. Therefore, we
estimate our model with only GOVERNMENT or PRIVATE by controlling for
other variables such as urbanisation, schooling, public investments, distance,
initial GDP and crisis. As seen in Panel B, Table 5, government-owned bank
credits do not have a significant coefficient in general, but they are positively
associated with the per capita real GDP growth rate in advocate, less-developed
and non-advocate, developed provinces. Furthermore, there is positive and sig-
nificant association between private bank credits and the economic growth rate
of Turkish provinces, regardless of the development level of a province. The
association between private bank credits and provincial growth rate is not
found to change significantly in advocate provinces.
As another robustness check, we estimate our model using dynamic GMM
excluding the provincial fixed effects. The consistency of the dynamic GMM
estimator depends on the validity of the instrument and the assumption that
error term does not exhibit serial correlation. Our estimates indicate that the
coefficients are not consistent because the results of Sargan tests for all prov-
inces and for priority and non-priority provinces imply that the instrument
is not valid. They indicate that our model is over-identified. Moreover, the
error term exhibits serial correlation. Unlike our results with fixed effects, the12 Although ADVOCATE can be considered to be an alternative IV, the correlation between ADVO-
CATE and GOVERNMENT is found to be 0.0157 and the correlation coefficient between ADVO-
CATE and GROWTH is found to be 0.1423 (Table A1). Therefore, we did not use it as an IV for
GOVERNMENT.
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 5
Robustness Checks
All
Provinces
Priority
Provinces
Non-Priority
Provinces
Panel A – IV Estimation
GOVERNMENT )0.3403 0.0238 )0.1064
(0.2778) (22.1138) (0.3103)
ADVOCATE * GOVERNMENT 0.0268** 0.0342*** 0.0024
(0.0106) (0.0125) (0.0142)
PRIVATE 0.0321** 0.1094** 0.0189
(0.0135) (0.0454) (0.0117)
ADVOCATE * PRIVATE )0.0115*** )0.0499 )0.0055
(0.0043) (0.0315) (0.0050)
Adjusted R2 0.3949 0.4088 0.4465
Panel B – Estimations without Controlling for Credit Granted by Other Ownership-Type Banks
GOVERNMENT 0.0143 0.0105 0.0407**
(0.0135) (0.0122) (0.0194)
ADVOCATE * GOVERNMENT 0.0142 0.0313*** )0.0235**
(0.0114) (0.0080) (0.0092)
Adjusted R2 0.3970 0.3996 0.4461
PRIVATE 0.0190** 0.0837** 0.0163***
(0.0075) (0.0356) (0.0062)
ADVOCATE * PRIVATE )0.0062 )0.0177 )0.0045
(0.0040) (0.0355) (0.0030)
Adjusted R2 0.3964 0.4014 0.4490
Panel C – Dynamic GMM Estimation
GOVERNMENT 0.0148*** )0.0360*** 0.1050**
(0.0040) (0.0137) (0.0479)
ADVOCATE * GOVERNMENT 0.1025*** 0.0645*** 0.0648
(0.0095) (0.0145) (0.0692)
PRIVATE )0.0244*** 0.2854*** )0.0007
(0.0048) (0.0481) (0.0158)
ADVOCATE * PRIVATE 0.0504*** )0.1712*** 0.0184**
(0.0059) (0.0420) (0.0081)
Sargan test: v2 76.7700 44.5200 23.7100
(p-value) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Serial Correlation Coefficient 0.9303 0.9584 0.9100
(p-value) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Notes:
The model is estimated but only the coefficients on government-owned and private bank credits are reported
in this table. The standard errors are reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, ** and ***
show significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels, respectively. The estimates of all of
the coefficients are available from the authors upon request. The Sargan test row indicates v2 and p-values
in parentheses and tests the null hypothesis that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals
from the regression. The residual correlation coefficient tests the null hypothesis that the errors in the first-
difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation.
 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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POLITICAL CONNECTION, BANK CREDITS AND GROWTH 1061coefficients on GOVERNMENT are found to be positive and significant in all
provinces (Panel C, Table 5). Similar to our findings with fixed effects, they
are found to be significant in less-developed and politically connected and
non-advocate, developed provinces. Moreover, the coefficients on private
bank credit per capita are found to be positive and significant in the priority
provinces.
In sum, the robustness checks generally support the earlier findings. Govern-
ment-owned banks’ credits are found to be positively associated with the
growth of the politically favoured less-developed provinces, and the developed
but not politically connected provinces. On the other hand, private bank credits
seem to benefit all and especially less-developed provinces.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Government-owned banks are prevalent in developing countries as they are
meant to fund socially desirable projects, alleviate poverty and focus on com-
panies, individuals or areas that might not be considered creditworthy by pri-
vate banks. Most of the existing empirical studies, however, do not support any
of these roles of the government-owned banks. Rather, the studies are consis-
tent with the ‘political view’ that government-owned banks direct scarce
resources to promote private interests, in particular favouring politically desir-
able projects. In this study, we examine the role of credits provided by govern-
ment-owned and private banks on per capita real GDP growth rate at the
provincial level and investigate how this association changes in politically
connected provinces.
This study’s main finding is that credits from government-owned banks do
not have a significant relationship with the local growth rate in Turkish prov-
inces even though credits from private banks are positively associated with the
real per capita GDPs of provinces, regardless of their development level or the
political affiliation of their local administrators. Government-owned banks
are found to benefit significantly only those provinces that are categorised as
underdeveloped but politically closer to the incumbent government, and also
those developed provinces that are not politically connected. These findings
support the validity of the ‘political view’ in Turkey during 1992–2006. Inter-
estingly, our results suggest that government can reduce the economic disparity
among regions through public investments rather than credits provided by
government-owned banks.
Our results suggest that government-owned banks do not achieve their appar-
ent objectives of improving growth rates and reducing disparity among prov-
inces. As it is difficult to completely de-politicise these banks in developing
countries with relatively weak institutions, one alternative might be to privatise 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1062 Z. ONDER AND S. OZYILDIRIMthese banks. Although there are evidences that former government-owned
banks perform better in terms of profitability and efficiency after they have
been privatised (see, for example, Clarke et al., 2005), the privatisation of
government-owned banks may not immediately alleviate the existing market
failures in the regional economies.
Another solution may be to replace government-owned banks with mutual
banks or cooperative banks in the less-developed regions of Turkey. As shown
by Iannotta et al. (2007), mutual banks in Europe have better loan quality and
lower asset risk than both private and government-owned banks. Moreover,
Gutierrez (2008) points out that in Italy, after recent merger activity, coopera-
tive banks turned into cooperative groups and increased their presence in the
provision of loans to certain market segments, particularly small and medium
enterprises. However, cooperative banks may need to be innovative in local
development finance while building profitable relationships with entrepreneurs
and farmers in the less-developed regions.
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution like the other
finance-growth studies that analyse the impact of financial services provided by
government on growth. In addition to the endogeneity problem observed in the
growth literature, government ownership of banks could be a policy choice to
achieve some economic or political objectives of the incumbent governments
(Rodrik, 2005). 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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